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Abstract 
In his Dimbleby Lecture in December 2002, the Archbishop of Canterbury examined the effect of the emergence of 
the market state on the legitimacy of government activity in areas of morality. He suggested that while this is 
becoming limited, the continuing need to provide a moral context for social life provided an opportunity for 
religious communities to play a crucial role. This piece suggests that the increasing significance of market 
concepts in health care law poses a similar challenge to the moral basis of medical practice, threatening to drive 
moral argument outside of the scope of the discipline with the consequent effect of undermining the values that 
drive good health care. Thus the de-moralisation of medicine is also demoralising for those within the health 
professions. To counteract this tendency, a strong sense of a common moral community needs to be maintained 
amongst those engaged with the discipline of health care law. 
 
This paper also examines the role of law in this area. Traditionally, legal scholars have attacked the reluctance of 
legislators and the judiciary to wrestle from the grip of doctors the authority to determine ethical issues. The 
dominant view has been that this was a failure to recognise the fact that society has a stake in these matters and 
that legal non-intervention was an abdication of responsibility that undermines the rule of law. However, the 
integration of medical and moral decision-making into a collaborative enterprise can also be seen as a more 
effective defence against the forces of demoralisation than the separation that the orthodox approach implies. If 
this is correct, then a key task for health care lawyers, as yet undeveloped, is to consider how to establish a 
legitimate common moral community, and what role the law might have to play in that process. 
 
Introduction 
 
An inaugural lecture is an opportunity to take stock of one’s subject, to ask how it has 
reached the state that it is in and to consider where it might be going.
1
 It is also a 
chance to give recognition to the thinkers and influences that have played a role in 
paving the path that is being trod. 
 
My inspiration for the specific form of this lecture has come from the Dimbleby 
Lecture delivered by Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury in December 
2002.
2
 He took as a theme the argument of the American strategist, historian and legal 
academic Philip Bobbitt. In a monumental book, The Shield of Achilles,3 Bobbitt 
argued that the world of the nation-state was ending and that the new context for the 
exercise of authority, including legal authority, was the market state. In this new 
world order, the legitimacy of governments over moral and social issues was severely 
diminished and the practical reach of their power substantially limited. On Bobbitt’s 
account, the market state is legitimated by its ability to increase choice and 
                                                   
1
 This paper is a revised version of an inaugural lecture delivered in Southampton on 12 November 
2003. I am grateful to many friends and colleagues for their comments before and since. Amongst the 
most significant commentators on this particular paper have been Margot Brazier, Jose Miola, Elsa 
Montgomery, Derek Morgan and Jenny Steele. I take full responsibility for the weaknesses that remain. 
2
 The text of the speech can be downloaded from www.archbishopofcanterbury.org. 
3
 P Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles (London, Penguin 2002). 
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opportunity rather than any substantive values. As a result, it has lost the right to 
enforce any particular morality. His examples are wide ranging, but include health 
care issues such as the loss of the power to restrict access to contraception and 
abortion.
4
  
 
Rowan Williams noted that in such a world, government and culture – the ability to 
locate the choices we make within a framework of values – drift apart. Elsewhere, he 
has pointed out that making mature choices involves closing down some possibilities 
as well as opening up others. Pursuing choice alone, as an intrinsic rather than an 
instrumental good, undermines our opportunities to build up a consistent pattern of 
decision making. In fact, it infantilises us by robbing us of the chance to build a 
framework of meaning, of which morality is an important part. Choice in this sense is 
actually in conflict with autonomy, if that is understood as living according to one’s 
own system of values. It undermines the creation of a value system by presenting 
choices over time as unconnected with each other and encouraging arbitrariness rather 
than consistency.
 5
 
 
In the Dimbleby Lecture, Williams argued for the place of religion in sustaining the 
possibility of morality in this new world. If governments are losing legitimacy in the 
enforcement of morality, he suggested, this made it even more important that religions 
embraced the responsibility for giving life ‘meaning’. He summarised the issue in 
these terms: 
 
In the pre-modern period, religion sanctioned the social order; in the modern period it was a 
potential rival to be pushed to the edges, a natural reaction. But are we at the point where, as 
the 'public sphere' becomes more value-free, the very survival of the idea of a public sphere, a 
realm of political argument about vision and education, is going to demand that we take 
religion a good deal more seriously? 
 
I want to ask similar questions about the role of law in the world of health care. I will 
suggest that the discipline of health care law is at risk of being transformed. Moving 
from a discipline in which the moral values of medical ethics (and those of the non-
medical health professions) are a central concern, to one in which they are being 
supplanted by an amoral commitment to choice and consumerism.
6
 In other words, 
that the morality is being taken out of medicine by legal activity. I would not claim 
that law is the only pressure pushing in this direction. Both Labour and Conservative 
rhetoric on their plans for the National Health Service place ‘choice’ at the centre, as 
the main value to be pursued.
7
 However, health care law has the potential to be 
applied either to resist this drift into choice for its own sake, unrooted in more 
fundamental values, or to promote it and we should examine its place carefully. 
 
The issues can be traced in the context of the doctrine of informed consent, one of the 
fundamental building blocks of both health care ethics and health care law.
8
 In 
                                                   
4
 See e.g. p 230 for his analysis of the current position and pp 735-6 for a vision of the future. 
5
 R. Williams, Lost Icons (London, T & T Clark 2000), esp. ch 1. 
6
 I raised concerns of a similar nature about the emergence of a rights model in ‘Patients first: the role 
of rights’ in K. Fulford, S. Ersser & T. Hope (eds) Essential Practice in Patient-Centred Care (Oxford, 
Blackwell Science 1996).  
7
 The NHS Improvement Plan : Putting people at the heart of public services (London: Department of 
Health 2004), Setting Patients Free (London: Conservative Policy Unit 2003) 
8
 Although strictly the full doctrine of informed consent probably remains unrecognised in English law 
it is dominant in the work of commentators. Even with the ambiguous reference to surgery without 
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traditional terms, commentators have seen that doctrine as a means for promoting the 
autonomy of patients – their ability to take control of their lives and to shape them as 
they wish.
9
 The choices they make are one of the ways in which they shape their own 
life stories. Ensuring that patients receive good quality information is part of the 
process of enabling them to exercise such autonomy. On this account, autonomy is a 
positive value reflecting the sort of people we believe fully reflect our human 
potential.
10
 Informed consent in legal terms, however, can be seen as concerned as 
much with the constraint of power than directly with the value of autonomy itself.
11
 
One of the threats to autonomy is external control. Requiring disclosure of 
information about treatment options is a mechanism to reduce the power exercised by 
health professionals over their patients. If patients are informed of the facts and able 
to exercise choice they are less vulnerable to professional control – the law ensures 
that it is for patients to choose what happens, not doctors.
12
 This is a negative 
justification for informed consent based on its role in limiting undesirable 
paternalism, but it is expected to promote the positive value of autonomy by creating 
the circumstances in which it can be exercised. The legal doctrine of informed consent 
is thus not identical to the ethical notion of autonomy, but it is justified as promoting 
it.
13
  
 
In the hands of some types of lawyer, however, the doctrine can take a rather different 
form. A particularly illuminating example of this can be seen in the Data Protection 
Act 1998. One area of concern arises in relation to the transfer of personal data 
abroad, to countries where data protection laws are less strict (such as the USA). The 
Data Protection Act recognises this by requiring a data controller, say a health 
researcher, who will be transferring information in this way to do one of two things. 
Either they must take steps to ensure that adequate protections are in place, such as by 
placing contractual limitations on the use and retention of data, or they must inform 
the subjects that their data will be going abroad.
14
  
 
Informed consent theory would imply that the second alternative was a means of 
promoting autonomy – patients make their choices on the basis of explicit information 
and are thus able to make the choices they want unbiased by poor understanding. 
                                                                                                                                                 
informed consent being ‘unlawful’ in Chester v Asfar [2004] UKHL 41, para 14, it seems clear that this 
case, the most pro-informed consent decision yet delivered, saw the relevant legal doctrine as 
negligence to enforce a ‘duty to warn’ rather than trespass where the validity of consent is the key issue 
(see e.g. para 60). 
9
 See P. Alderson & J. Montgomery, Health Care Choices: Making decisions with children (London, 
Institute for Public Policy Research 1996) 18-20 for a discussion of the value of autonomy in the 
construction of health care law. 
10
 Consider, for example J.S.Mill’s account of the importance of liberty in On Liberty (London, Dent). 
11
 See e.g. I. Kennedy, ‘The doctor-patient relationship’ in P. Byrne (ed) Rights ands Wrongs in 
Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986) 7-21, esp. 12-15. Although see also the reference to 
autonomy and dignity as foundations in Chester v Asfar [2004] UKHL 41, per Lord Steyn at paras 18, 
24.  
12
 This, rather than ‘autonomy and dignity’, is the principal rationale given for the legal duty to warn 
patients of risks by the judges in Chester v Asfar [2004] UKHL 41, see Lord Bingham (para 5), Lord 
Steyn (para 14 although see also para 18 as noted in the previous footnote), Lord Hope (para 86), Lord 
Walker (para 92). Lord Hoffman suggested that the purpose was to provide an opportunity to avoid or 
reduce risk, a rationale related to avoidance of harm rather than either autonomy or choice. 
13
 See T.L. Beauchamp & J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press 5
th
 ed 2001) 77-79 for a discussion of the difference between institutional practices for 
gaining consent and the idea of informed consent as the exercise of autonomy. 
14
 Data Protection Act 1998, Sch 1, Pt II, para. 13; Sch 4 para. 1; 8
th
 Data Protection Principle. 
‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26(2) LS 185-210 Accepted Version  4 of 26 
10:44 07/08/2014 
However, this promotes autonomy only in a very unsatisfactory sense. For drug 
companies, informed consent to the transfer of information is by far the preferable 
route. It absolves them of any requirement to protect the privacy of research 
participants. Participants know what is happening, the argument goes, so the drug 
companies have met their legal responsibilities. The participants’ ability to control 
what is happening to their data may be feeble, but they have been informed and can 
therefore exercise a choice. Their choice is, however, strictly limited. They can 
decline to participate in the trial but if they choose to take part they have no means to 
control what happens to the data when transferred abroad. Further, an apparent 
increase in informed consent has actually served to reduce the obligations of 
researchers to protect the interests of participants. Promoting participants’ ability to 
shape their lives would be more enhanced by the researchers maintaining the 
responsibility for protecting privacy. The law has substituted a formal requirement of 
openness for a substantive one of protection. Perhaps more tellingly, the people 
protected by informed consent are the researchers and drug companies not the 
research participants. The legal doctrine of informed consent has actually undermined 
autonomy as it has reduced the force of the moral obligation on researchers to protect 
the ability of participants to shape their own lives. The law permits researchers to give 
information and get consent as a substitute for ensuring that participants can control 
the use of data about them. 
 
Consent forms, particularly for pharmaceutical research, can become so long and 
detailed that they are as likely to confuse people as to assist them making choices. The 
purpose of these forms is not so much to enhance the quality of decision making as to 
transfer the risks involved in trials to the research subjects. As if to say that ‘the 
participants knew this might happen, because we told them, so they willingly ran the 
risks and we cannot be blamed if they materialise’. One fifteen year old interviewed 
by Priscilla Alderson about consent to surgery captured this with the acute insight that 
children often bring: 
 
Its not the doctors’ fault if something goes wrong. Your parents are to blame, 
because they’ve signed the form, it would be their fault.15 
 
Consider the so-called ‘informed refusal forms’ where in effect patients are asked to 
sign to show that they accept the risks of rejecting professional advice. Lord 
Donaldson expressed his criticism of this development in the following terms 
 
It is clear that these forms are designed primarily to protect the hospital from 
legal action….[they should] separate the disclaimer of liability on the part of 
the hospital from what really matters, namely the declaration by the patient of 
his decision with a full appreciation of the possible terms…16 
 
Consent in the hands of these legal advisers is not about promoting the moral value of 
autonomy but about removing the need for health professionals to take responsibility 
for treatment being in the interests of their patients by transferring that responsibility 
to them. The moral value of autonomy is not in fact promoted and the moral purpose 
of health care is obscured.  
                                                   
15
 Quoted in P. Alderson & J. Montgomery, Health Care Choices: Making decisions with children 
(London: Institute for Public Policy Research 1996) at p 45. 
16
 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) (1992) 9 BMLR 46, 61. 
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Hence, my title refers to the ‘de-moralisation’ of medicine. I shall be drawing 
attention to some of the ways in which the scope for moral reflection and action is 
being reduced by developments in the operation of health care law. I will further 
suggest that the results of this process is thoroughly demoralising for those in the 
health professions – threatening to rob them of their rationale for coming to work in 
health services in the first place. If the law is to blame, even in part, for these twin 
processes of demoralisation, then it can fairly be criticised.  
 
But, I shall also seek to explain why I do not believe we should despair. Rowan 
Williams went on to argue that the retreat of the state from the sphere of values was 
an opportunity for traditions, especially from his perspective religious traditions, that 
enshrine and embody a system of values to be revitalised as playing a central role in 
community life. I want to consider whether there is a similar opportunity for 
maintaining a system of values within health care, and specifically what role lawyers 
and the law might have to play in that process. 
 
 
The changing role of litigation 
 
My concern about the way in which the law is impacting on health care can also be 
drawn out from a consideration of the way in which the law is used by campaigning 
groups. While it sometimes has arbitrary and distorting elements,
17
 litigation can be 
seen as one of the ways in which the nature and values of the law can be established 
and shaped. Derek Morgan and Bob Lee have developed the concept of a ‘stigmata 
case’ to capture this process.18 Such cases have five features.19 They are relatively 
novel and ethically controversial; raise the balance of personal interests and public 
interest; force us to consider the goals of medical practice; they offer an opportunity 
to take stock of the boundaries between the anomalous and routine, the normal and 
the pathological; and they require the courts to develop a social, even moral, vision to 
respond to the social and cultural revolution of contemporary medicine.’ Morgan and 
Lee cite as examples of such cases those of Tony Bland, Diane Blood, and the 
conjoined twins known as Jodie and Mary.
20
 
 
The essence of a ‘stigmata case’ is that it enables the marks of a deeper system of 
values to be seen on the surface of a specific dispute.
21
 Its resolution will tell us 
something about the society in which we live as well as establishing what steps need 
                                                   
17
 I. Kennedy & J. Stone ‘Making public policy on medico-moral issues’ in P. Byrne (ed) Ethics and 
law in health care research (London: King’s Fund 1990); P. Alderson & J. Montgomery, Health Care 
Choices: Making decisions with children (London: Institute for Public Policy Research 1996) at pp 38-
9. 
18
 D. Morgan & R. Lee, ‘In the name of the father? Ex p Blood: Dealing with novelty and anomaly’ 
(1997) 60 MLR 840. 
19
 R. Lee & D. Morgan, ‘Regulating Risk Society; stigmata cases, scientific citizenship and biomedical 
diplomacy’ (2001) Sydney Law Review 297-318. 
20
 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687, Re A [2000] 3 FCR 577. 
21
 The metaphor is drawn from the phenomenon sometimes reported in the Christian religious tradition 
where the wounds received by Christ on the cross appear on the bodies of believers, seen as the 
external manifestation of an ecstatic religious experience. 
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to be taken.
22
 Thus, litigation provides a context in which the values of a society can 
be expressed and also a mechanism whereby clashes of competing values can be 
resolved. However, a new type of case is emerging that actually obscures such value 
conflicts and in which the translation of conflict into the discourse of law excludes 
moral debate rather than enables it to be addressed. If this type becomes the norm, 
then once again, more law turns out to mean less morality.  
 
In their later assessment of the concept of the ‘stigmata case’, Morgan and Lee 
suggested that it needed to take more account of the issue of the allocation of the 
power to decide.
23
 The case of the conjoined twins, they argue, effectively results in 
the delegation of control to the doctors. Such delegation could be said to be one of the 
defining characteristics of an integrated approach to law, morality and medicine 
whereby a framework is developed to promote recognition of the moral choices to be 
made but not to dictate outcomes. This model is explored further below, together with 
its manifestation in the style of judging adopted by some members of the bench. 
However, resolving disputes by delegation to a chosen decision-maker, rather than 
addressing the substantive issues, reduces the extent to which the moral conflicts that 
are exposed by stigmata cases appear in the corpus of the legal rules. While the event 
of litigation may give rise to the social phenomenon described by Morgan and Lee, it 
is far from clear that it can be seen within the discourse of the law itself. The 
recognition that the identification of decision makers is one of the key functions of 
health care law has led to the emergence of test case litigation seeking to challenge 
precisely the allocation of power. This is not new, but what is changing is the nature 
of the connection between law and morality that such cases expose. 
 
The most famous early test case in this area is probably that brought by Victoria 
Gillick in 1984.
24
 She challenged a health service circular that advised doctors that 
they could give advice to and prescribe contraception for young people without the 
involvement of their parents. From that litigation emerged the concept now generally 
known as ‘Gillick competence’ and a debate over the nature of parental responsibility 
which has shaped the status of young people in health services for the past two 
decades.
25
 
 
This case carried many of the ‘stigmata’ that we have referred to. It forced a 
reconsideration of the relationship between parents and children, an assessment of 
how health professionals should relate to families, and required an examination of the 
potential criminal liability of health professionals for doing what they regarded as 
their moral duty. Mrs Gillick brought a hypothetical action, in that none of her own 
children were in fact said to be seeking treatment at the time. Nevertheless, she argued 
an unashamedly substantive case.
26
 She asserted that parents had the right to take 
                                                   
22
 There are some parallels here with the account of Mary Ann Glendon’s book Abortion and Divorce 
in Western Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1987) in which the theories of the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz are used to show how laws can be seen as a way in which societies 
project their values. 
23
 R. Lee & D. Morgan, ‘Regulating Risk Society; stigmata cases, scientific citizenship and biomedical 
diplomacy’ (2001) Sydney Law Review 297-318, 298 fn 6. 
24
 Gillick v W. Norfolk AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
25
 See P. Alderson & J. Montgomery, Health Care Choices: Making decisions with children (London, 
Institute for Public Policy Research 1996. 
26
 For a more detailed examination of the legal nature of her claims, see J. Montgomery ‘Children as 
Property?’ (1988) 51 MLR 323-342. 
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decisions about their children's lives and called upon the law to back her in her claim 
by requiring doctors to defer to the parents rather than treat young people as patients 
in their own right. When she lost, the rights of young people were established and the 
implications of the recognition that our society valued the autonomy of young people 
began to be worked through in policy, practice, legislation and the courts. 
 
Compare this to the recent spate of litigation brought by the Pro-Life Alliance 
challenging the authority of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. That 
Authority was set up to regulate the provision of fertility services and oversee embryo 
research following a protracted policy making process taking the best part of a 
decade.
27
 The basic structure of the system established under the Human Embryology 
and Fertilisation Act 1990 is that the Authority is empowered to determine what 
treatment and research is permitted, within limits set by Parliament, through a 
licensing system.
28
 The Act prohibits certain practices absolutely, and prohibits others 
unless they are licensed. Practices outside the scope of the Act are unregulated and 
governed by more general principles of health care law including the requirement of 
consent. The overarching tort of negligence would provide compensation where 
professionals act in ways unacceptable to their peers. 
 
The effect of this scheme is to entrust to the members of the Authority the power and 
responsibility to determine what morality requires. The statute and the regulations 
made under it indicate what our elected representatives have identified as key moral 
boundaries and issues. The licensing powers of the authority permit it to establish 
further moral norms through the imposition of conditions and the development of the 
Code of Practice. This flexible framework has enabled issues such as the provision of 
services to single women and same sex couples to be worked through without the 
need for further legislative activity. 
 
In 2003, the judicial committee of the House of Lords considered the place of cloning 
in this scheme.
29
 It was suggested by the ProLife Alliance that human cloning using a 
process called cell nuclear replacement was outside the scope of the Act and could not 
be licensed by the Authority. In some respects the case is extremely interesting as an 
example of statutory interpretation. The House of Lords construed the statute 
purposively, finding that, despite the detailed arguments on drafting pointing in a 
different direction, the general intention of Parliament was clear. This was that it 
wished decisions on the use of reproductive technology to be made by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Consequently, the House of Lords found that 
cloning by cell nuclear replacement fell within the scope of the Act, giving the HFEA 
the power to regulate it. 
 
For the purposes of this piece, the most interesting feature of this case is the way in 
which the substantive moral debate over the ethics of cloning was excluded from the 
                                                   
27
 R. Lee & D. Morgan, Human Fertilisation and  Embryology: Regulating the Reproductive 
Revolution (London, Blackstone Press 2001) provides the best general study of the Act and its 
operation. See also the report of the House of Commons Committee on Science and Technology, 
Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law HC 7 2004-5. 
28
 J. Montgomery, ‘Rights, restraints and pragmatism’ (1991) 54 MLR 524-534. 
29
 R (on the application of Quintavelle(on behalf of ProLife Alliance)) v Secretary of State for Health 
[2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 All ER 113. See also R (on the application of Quintavelle) v HFEA [2002] 
EWCA 667, [2003] 3 All ER 257 on the power to license tissue typing. 
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litigation. The ProLife alliance found itself putting forward the case that cloning by 
the CNR process was not within the scope of the 1990 Act. This was bizarre given 
that the consequence of that argument would be that there was no regulation of such 
cloning in humans and it could therefore be carried out without restriction. The moral 
stance of the ProLife Alliance was that no cloning should take place at all, but it 
found itself making an argument that it should be removed from regulation. Equally, 
the speeches in the House of Lords turn on legalistic arguments of construction and do 
not examine the substantive moral debates about cloning.  
 
In contrast to Gillick, there is a shift here; from the focus of litigation being on 
substantive moral arguments to issues of formal legitimacy. The legitimacy or 
otherwise of the power of the HFEA to regulate cloning is assessed by reference to 
the legal pedigree of its authority – the intention of the legislator – not the nature of 
the issue itself. This is a classic strategy of legal positivism, an approach to legal 
theory that seeks to argue that legal legitimacy and moral authority need to be 
considered separately not as an integrated activity.
30
 Where the approach holds, the 
stigmata of our value system will no longer appear on the bodies of our judgments. 
The morality will be sucked out of them. 
 
In the light of this perspective, was the Blood litigation really a ‘stigmata Case’ or 
should it be seen as part of the demoralisation process? There are aspects of both. 
Dianne Blood’s main challenge to the statutory regime concerned its consent 
provisions. She claimed that her deceased husband wanted her to be able to conceive 
children using his sperm, even if that had to occur posthumously. Her evidence was 
that they had discussed the possibility so that she knew what he would have wanted. 
Her difficulty was that the legislation required written consent before this was 
permissible. On her account, it was only because Stephen Blood’s death had been 
unexpected that no such record had been made. She suggested that the formality of 
writing was subsidiary to the key principle of consent and that she should therefore be 
permitted to use his sperm to seek to establish a pregnancy. In substantive terms, this 
aspect of the case touches on the proper balance between the general public interest in 
certainty and the private interests of the individual. 
 
A second aspect of the case also seems properly assigned to the stigmata category – 
the question of whether it was lawful to remove sperm samples from Stephen Blood’s 
body either when he was in a coma or possibly after his death. This raises profound 
questions about the acceptability of an intervention made not to benefit the patient, 
but to enable his wife to make choices about her future life without him. Here, again 
the legal precedents were against Dianne Blood. The only recognised justification for 
treatment without consent, outside of statutory framework for compulsory mental 
health treatment, was the interests of the patient.
31
 Questions as to whether this 
properly reflects our social values in relation to family membership, or when proper 
respect for human bodies after death is compatible with donation of organs or samples 
are properly seen as carrying the moral significance that marks out ‘stigmata cases’.32 
 
On each of these ‘stigmata’ issues, Dianne Blood lost her case. The Court of Appeal 
found that the samples were taken unlawfully and that there could be no dispensation 
                                                   
30
 J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford  University Press 1979). 
31
 F v W Berkshire HA [1989] 2 All ER 545. 
32
 These issues were debated in Parliament in consideration of the Human Tissue Act 2004. 
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from the statutory requirement of written consent. The moral policy enshrined in the 
law was upheld. Yet, Dianne Blood is now the proud mother of two children and has 
secured legislation to amend the law to enable them to be registered as the children of 
their dead father.
33
 The Court of Appeal held that she was entitled to take the 
unlawfully obtained sperm abroad to a clinic in Europe. The fact that she could win 
her case despite the morality-based legal arguments going against her raises the third 
illustration of the increasing demoralisation of health care law. She won her case by 
arguing that the issues before the court should be seen as concerning the freedom of 
the European market in services. Although the final decision was left to the HFEA to 
make, as it had not previously taken this dimension into account, the Court of Appeal 
indicated that it was unlikely that Dianne Blood’s case could be resisted.34 An 
apparently quintessential ‘stigmata case’ transmuted into a market issue where public 
policy is of limited if any relevance. This enabled the public sympathy for Mrs 
Blood’s position to be assuaged without altering the principles enshrined in the law. 
However, it meant that the stigmata of the underlying issues were manifested only in 
the solution to the specific case, not in the legal rules (which were preserved 
untouched). Thus, the link between moral debate and legal doctrine was severed. 
 
 
Health care in the market 
 
The use of EU law on the common market has a broader significance for the 
development of health care law. Bobbitt has warned that the dominance of the market 
has undermined the legitimacy of government policy in areas of morality. Health care 
law based on a market model is likely to bring similar impotence. For those with 
money, choice over access to health services has long been wider than for the poor. 
But the nature of this extension is changing. It is no longer merely an issue of speed of 
access, range and possibly quality of services. What is now emerging is the impact of 
the market in health services on what have been traditionally seen as major matters of 
domestic policy. The Blood case shows that a determined woman with money can 
evade the policy restrictions established by Parliament over the availability of 
posthumous conception. As Margaret Brazier and Nicola Glover have pointed out, 
restrictions on the availability of Viagra by making it a prescription-only medicine are 
easily evaded by those with internet access and a credit card.
35
 The prohibition on 
euthanasia in the UK can now be evaded by travelling to Switzerland.
36
  
 
The impact of market consumerism on UK health care law has been limited to date 
because the vast majority of care is delivered through the National Health Service and 
the courts have resisted the concept of entitlements to care. When the father of 
Jaymee Bowen sought to use the courts to force Cambridge Health Authority to fund 
treatment for his daughter he found that the Court of Appeal believed that judges 
should not be drawn into disputes over the allocation of resources and should be wary 
of intervening into clinical matters, which were properly within the scope of medical 
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discretion. Although the clinical issues were clearly controversial, in the light of the 
disagreements exposed by Jaymee’s situation, the Court of Appeal took the view that 
judges should not override the clinical assessment made by the Cambridge Health 
Authority.
37
 The High Court judge, Laws J, felt that insufficient regard had been paid 
to the human rights issues raised,
38
 but the Court of Appeal declined to juridify the 
issues into matters of rights. Instead, it preferred to focus on the exercise of discretion 
in the performance of public powers. 
 
However, the situation is changing for reasons of both law and policy. So far as policy 
is concerned, the Government plans to significantly increase the extent to which 
health services are delivered by a mixed economy by ensuring that patients are able to 
choose where they receive their treatment from a range of providers, including at least 
one from the independent sector. A system of tariff prices has been developed to 
enable such providers and NHS bodies to compete for patients on an equal financial 
basis.
39
 ‘Guarantees’ of treatment within specific time limits are to be offered, moving 
towards an ideology of entitlement to services rather than seeing patients as the 
passive recipients of state beneficence. 
 
Interesting questions will arise as to the enforceability of such guarantees.
40
 Even 
now, however, there are indications that at least some members of the judiciary are 
prepared to explore the potential for enforceable legal rights. In R (Burke) v GMC 
Munby J referred to a right to require treatment in a hypothetical context.
41
 More 
concretely, he considered the issues in the case of Mrs Yvonne Watts.
42
 Mrs Watts 
sought reimbursement from her local primary care trust of the cost of hip replacement 
treatment she had received in France on the basis that she was entitled to the treatment 
under the NHS. She had made the arrangements to be treated in France after having 
been told that she would need to wait approximately one year before the NHS would 
be able to carry out the operation. 
 
The Yvonne Watts case raises similar ambiguities to that of Jaymee Bowen. Should it 
be seen principally as a resource allocation issue – concerned primarily with money 
not people, pitting faceless ‘men in grey suits’ against vulnerable patients facing death 
or chronic and agonising pain? Or was the issue one of clinical judgment, concerning 
the assessment of the needs and interests of patients? Because, like Jaymee Bowen’s 
case, the issue concerned the funding of a specific procedure under a specific contract 
with an external health provider the issues can be seen more starkly than in general 
decisions about prioritisation of patient groups in block commissioning arrangements. 
 
The view of Yvonne Watts’ daughter was that surgery was urgently needed. This was 
reinforced by the assessment of the anaesthetist consulted in France, who expressed 
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concern that unless surgery was carried out by the middle of March 2003 there was a 
risk that Mrs Watts would be too weak to have it.
43
 The view taken by the doctors in 
Bedford was different. Originally, Mrs Watts was assessed as a ‘routine’ case – as 
deserving but no more deserving than other patients awaiting treatment. After a 
reassessment in accordance with the direction of the High Court, the English surgeon 
felt that Mrs Watts’ condition had perhaps deteriorated more quickly than he might 
have expected so that she should be treated ‘soon’ rather than as a routine patient. 
However, her case was still not felt to be ‘urgent’. The English consultant anaesthetist 
felt that Mrs Watts remained fit for surgery and was likely to remain so (a less 
pessimistic view than his French counterpart). While patients classified as routine 
cases would have expected to receive their surgery within 12 months, those to be 
treated ‘soon’ should have been operated on in 3-4 months. In Mrs Watts’ case the 
reclassification meant that the operation would have been carried out under the NHS 
in April or May 2003. 
 
This reclassification meant that Mrs Watts failed in her claim for reimbursement, as 
she would have been treated within an acceptable time. However, she won the more 
important arguments about the impact of European Union law on the legal 
framework. Munby J recognised that it was clearly established that domestic law did 
not provide Mrs Watts with any remedy against the refusal to prioritise her case and 
to give her the operation she sought within the timescale that she and her daughter 
thought appropriate.
44
 Thus, any remedy provided by European law that required the 
provision of treatment would represent a significant change to legal structure of the 
NHS.
45
 However, he was prepared to find that European law required the NHS to pay 
for treatment in another member state if a patient faced ‘undue delay’ in receiving it 
in her own country. This held even though there could be no such requirement for 
reimbursement for the cost of private treatment in the UK.
46
 This creation of a right to 
treatment is the first important feature of the dawning new approach to health care law 
of which the Watts case may be the harbinger. 
 
The second concerns the rejection of the conceptualisation of health care law as an 
aspect of welfare law. It is interesting to note the important differences between Art 
49 of the EC Treaty, on which the Watts case turned, and Article 22 of Council 
Regulation 1408/71. The former is an economic provision that aims to secure the free 
market in services and therefore protects the commercial interests of health service 
providers to be able to market their services across the European Union. The latter 
protects the beneficiaries of social security systems when they seek treatment in 
another member state.  
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Article 22(2) was redrafted in 1981 to ensure that member states retained the ability to 
determine the scope of treatment and to manage resources.
47
 The Article deals with 
circumstances when member states are obliged to authorise treatment in other 
countries under their welfare schemes. The original wording of the provision required 
authorisation to be given for treatment abroad whenever it ‘[could] not be provided 
for the person concerned within the territory of the Member State where he resides.’ 
The current drafting deliberately extended the discretionary power to grant or refuse 
authorisation to enable management through prioritisation of patients in terms of time, 
taking into account clinical need.
48
 It reads  
"The authorization required under paragraph 1(c) may not be refused where the 
treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the 
Member State on whose territory the person concerned resided and where he cannot 
be given such treatment within the time normally necessary for obtaining the 
treatment in question in the Member State of residence taking account of his current 
state of health and the probable course of the disease." 
 
Thus, where health care law is seen as a matter of social welfare provision managerial 
and clinical discretion are seen as essential to the regulatory framework. 
 
In the Watts case, however, the High Court concentrated on the provisions of Article 
49, conceptualising the case as one about restriction of the right to trade in health 
services. Munby J noted that various arguments that health services should not be 
regarded as simply another form of commercial enterprise had been rejected in a 
series of cases before the European Court of Justice. The argument that Article 49 was 
not applicable to social security was rejected in Kohll v Union des caisses de 
maladie.49 The suggestion that it was not applicable to hospital services in general 
was rejected in Vanbreukel v Alliance nartionale des mutualities chretiennes.50 In 
Geraets-Smits v Stichtung Ziekenfonds VGZ; Peerbohms v Stichting CZ Group 
Zorgverzekeringen the European Court of Justice had gone further still and found that 
Article 49 was applicable to hospital services even when they were provided free of 
charge, rejecting the suggestion that such benefits in kind were not to be seen as an 
‘economic activity’.51 Finally, in Muller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappji 
OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA; van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappji OZ 
Zorgverzekeringen UA the ECJ reiterated this view despite the attempts by the UK 
government and others to distinguish social insurance systems that provide only 
treatment and not financial benefits.
52
  
 
Munby J rejected the UK government’s attempts to distinguish the NHS system as 
‘technical’ and ‘marginal’ points.53 The two arguments offered were, firstly, that the 
NHS provided care itself (in the overwhelming majority of cases) and, secondly, that 
its doctors are salaried employees and were not reimbursed on a piecework basis 
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against a preset scale of fees (as in the Dutch system reviewed in Geraets-Smits). 
However, these could reasonably be seen as illustrations of the way in which NHS 
care is not conceptualised as an economic enterprise. That this is true in a legal as 
well as political sense can be shown by the lack of enforceability of rights to 
provision, already noted, and also in the approach to ‘prior authorisation’ of 
treatment.  
 
The High Court in Watts cited arguments used in the Kohll that European law 
precluded states making treatment abroad subject to prior authorisation when costs 
incurred within the member state are not subject to the need for such advance 
approval.
54
 In relation to the NHS, however, reimbursement within the state is subject 
to prior authorisation, as the Jaymee Bowen case shows. Indeed, in a weaker, but 
nevertheless important sense, the role of GPs as gatekeepers means that there is a 
system of prior authorisation for all NHS treatment, in that access to care (other than 
accident and emergency services) is dependant on a medical assessment of need by 
someone authorised by the state to commit public resources. The fundamental flaw in 
the reasoning process is to neglect the mechanisms for accessing treatment within the 
UK under the NHS system. The assumption on which the EU law is based is that it is 
not legitimate to raise higher barriers to the provision of service in other member 
states than would exist in relation to the member state in question. There is no 
discussion, however, of the actual barriers that exist within the member states.  
 
The decision in Vanbreukel emphasises that a lower level of cover for treatment 
abroad than at home is an unlawful restriction on freedom of services. There needs to 
be ‘at least an equally advantageous level of cover’ or else an objective justification 
for difference.
55
 Yet, this does not deal with the situation where there is no guarantee 
even at home. In that context, there is no lower level of cover for treatment abroad 
because the patient’s lack of entitlement applies equally at home as well as overseas. 
The neglect of this point is understandable in a number of the ECJ cases, including 
Gereats-Smits and Peerbohms because the treatment in question was not available at 
all in the state of residence. However, it is problematic where the ability of member 
states to manage the services that they provide within their domestic health systems is 
compromised by exposure to market disciplines that make the provision of treatment 
follow from the demands of patients rather than a clinical assessment of need and 
priority. 
 
This debate can clearly be linked with the thesis of this paper on the ‘demoralisation’ 
of health care as a consequence of engagement with the law. In a socialised health 
care system such as the NHS, the just management of resources and the balance to be 
struck between comprehensive provision for all and quick access for a few are matter 
for public policy and debate about the principles on which the NHS is founded. The 
arguments offered by the UK government in Muller Faure stressed the general 
economic impact of European law, undermining the balance of the system and 
depleting resources for more urgent treatment.
 56
 They did not offer an argument from 
fairness: that management of waiting lists was a form of prioritisation that sought to 
balance the competing interests of patients for resources. While the moral problems of 
rationing are generally masked under the guise of clinical judgment, decisions by 
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clinicians as to the urgency of care are the main means by which resource allocation is 
related to the moral claims of patients to priority treatment. Precluding such 
judgments by allocating resources on demand undermines the opportunity for ethical 
decision making. It is a further example of the displacement of moral arguments in 
favour of legal entitlements that are blind to many of the relevant factors.  
 
It is important to note that this is just as much a victory for health providers as a 
matter of patients’ rights. The spending of public money on health services becomes 
provider led in that those hospitals that can attract demand can then require NHS 
funds to be allocated to pay for care irrespective of whether the relevant PCT’s 
planned activity for that type of care has been exceeded. The allocation of expenditure 
to particular types of care is a mechanism for relative prioritisation of that care to 
other calls on health expenditure. Thus, forcing more expenditure on hip replacements 
provided abroad will alter the ability of the NHS to choose how much to spend on this 
type of care and reduce the amount available for other forms of care less amenable to 
marketing such as mental health. 
 
The Watts case is thus an illustration of the dangers of rights based systems in 
threatening to distort priorities.
57
 Ms Watts’s daughter was pushing for the PCT to 
fund overseas treatment even before the GP had written a letter referring her mother 
to the consultant. She knew about and raised the Geraets-Smits case with the PCT and 
the Department of Health and she was persistent in her championing of her mother’s 
position. She was well informed about the mechanisms to secure treatment overseas, 
both within the NHS and through the use of a specialist health logistics company, 
which arranged for treatment in a French clinic.
58
 This was not in fact a case of a 
patient despairing after learning how long they would have to wait, but of an 
enterprising woman playing the system intelligently to maximise her mother’s 
interests. This illustrates the likely impact of the system suggested by the Watts 
decision: one based on entitlements to care, tradeable in the market through what is 
effectively a voucher system. It will benefit those skilled at using markets, both 
patients and health providers. It will do so at the expense of distributive justice, once 
again undermining the ability of the NHS to pursue moral principles. 
 
This was well understood by the Court of Appeal in Watts. 59 Mirroring the 
approaches seen in the different levels of court in the Jaymee Bowen case, the terms 
in which the Court of Appeal referred the issues to the European Court of Justice 
show how it conceptualised the case from the perspective of service provision rather 
than individual rights. Munby J considered whether Mrs Watts would only receive 
services after an unacceptable delay, examining her position without regard to that of 
other potential patients. He was even prepared to override managerial and clinical 
discretion about priority by forming his own view of what constituted an unacceptable 
delay, rejecting the more traditional deference to clinicians on such matters. The 
Court of Appeal drew the attention of the ECJ to whether patients should be permitted 
to jump the queue by having recourse to law and whether it was appropriate for the 
courts to dictate how governments should allocate resources. Similarly, in the earlier 
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case, Laws J had seen the issues as revolving around the human rights of Jaymee 
Bowen, but the Court of Appeal had understood the focus of the case to be the proper 
management of scarce resources. In both cases, the Court of Appeal has showed itself 
reluctant to regard rationing issues as justiciable. 
 
The question of what approach judges should take depends very much on their 
understanding of the relationship between law and health care practice. I have argued 
that there is a common theme to be seen in the use to which consent law has been put, 
the changing nature of test case litigation, and the emerging interest in the application 
of EU single market rules. That theme is that substantive moral debates are becoming 
more difficult to accommodate within the discourse of law. Whether and how this 
matters depends on an analysis of the desired connection between law and morality.  
 
 
Modelling morality in medical law 
 
Not all ways of thinking about the relationship between law and health care practice 
exclude morality. Much depends on the assumptions that we make about the nature of 
the disciplines concerned. The issues were opened up by Jo Jacob of the LSE in his 
suggestion that we should consider three models of the practice of medicine.
60
 Two of 
them, ‘scientific medicine’ and ‘participatory’ medicine, are built on the basis that 
medicine is a tool that needs to be directed. The implication is that understanding of 
the techniques to be used draws on a different sphere of knowledge than does the 
wisdom required to work out how and when they should be used. The first is technical 
domain, where the health care professionals are expert. The second is a sphere in 
which the claim to expertise can be spread more widely. The difference between the 
two models is that in the former the direction is given by the doctor, whereas in the 
latter it is shared between patient and doctor. 
 
It is this separation that has made the demoralisation process possible. It focuses our 
interest on who decides and encourages us to see health professionals as technicians. 
Thus, Ian Kennedy (now Sir Ian) once argued that ‘it is not for professionals to set the 
moral agenda for their relationship with those they serve. They have only extra duties, 
not privileges.’61 This analysis has encouraged medical law scholars to concern 
themselves with techniques that aim to limit the power of health professionals to areas 
of technical expertise. Thus, Kennedy went on to argue, ‘the advice which is the 
professional preserve of the doctor is that which is involved in treatment – advising as 
to what, if anything, can be done…. Rather than advice, what is really involved is 
information.’ 62Interestingly, he took a rather different view of what solicitors do. The 
advice given by a doctor is merely information about possibilities, not advice as to 
what it would be wise to do, but interestingly ‘advice giving is to a solicitor what 
diagnosis and treatment are to a doctor: namely what their skill consists in.’63  
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Kennedy was attacking the approach, explicitly taken by Lord Diplock in the Sidaway 
case that the practice of doctors should be considered generally and not subdivided so 
as to enable different aspects of health care to be judged against different types of 
test.
64
 In all aspects of their work, Diplock held, professionals should be judged 
against prevailing professional norms – were their actions regarded as acceptable 
practice by a responsible body of professional opinion? This is the standard known as 
the Bolam test after the case in which it was first formulated.65 The indivisibility of 
the professional duties of doctors (and other health workers) is key feature of what 
might be described as an integrated model of the relationship between technical skill 
and moral reasoning. On this model, moral reasoning is seen as an essential part of the 
practise of health care not some external process applied to it. This leads naturally to 
an integrated model of the relationship between health care law and morality in which 
it is assumed that professional practice already takes into account the moral dimension 
and approaches its regulation on that basis. Thus, reinforcing prevailing professional 
standards is also to reinforce moral practice. 
 
Such a model can be seen as pervading much of English health care law.
66
 The House 
of Lords has applied the Bolam test in ascertaining the scope of obligations to keep 
people alive and maintaining their capacity to reproduce – matters that relate to the 
fundamental human rights to life and to found a family.
67
 Legal regulation of access 
to abortion services is determined by whether doctors are acting in ‘good faith’ when 
they consider the questions set out in the legislation, not by direct consideration of 
those questions.
68
 The legal definition of death operates by incorporation of medical 
practice not by imposition of an external definition.
69
 
 
Although influential with judges, this integrated model has been seen as highly 
unsatisfactory by many academic and practising lawyers.
70
 The divisibility of 
professional functions would enable the law to drive medical practice from being 
‘scientific’ and doctor directed towards being ‘participative’ or patient directed. 
Health professionals will recognise the pattern here. There are close analogies with 
the drive for a stronger evidence base for practice; which (for all its virtues) reduces 
the role for individual clinical judgment. Increasing development of the scientific 
basis for practice also increases the ability to transfer power across to patients. 
Information can be made available to and used by patients, in turn making the 
delivery of care more responsive to patient choice. 
 
But for Jacob, the understanding of the nature of medicine on which his first two 
models operated failed to recognise the cultural context in which doctors are trained 
and socialised. He suggested that more regard needed to be had to the ‘classical’ or 
‘Hippocratic’ model of medicine, as he called it. He argued that professional 
knowledge, experience and values are all inculcated in an integrated process of 
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training and apprenticeship. This is still a pretty accurate description of how much 
medical education operates. Classroom and practical learning are both essential parts 
of the curriculum. Despite the specific teaching of medical ethics, and to some extent 
law, medical students still learn most of what they know about medical ethics from 
their experience of practice.  
 
Jacob argued that within the Hippocratic tradition, the separation of the process of 
determining what could be done from what should be done (on which the alternative 
models rely) was not recognised. The practice of medicine, on his view, itself 
enshrined a collegiate value system. Thus, one could extrapolate from his argument 
that to use the Bolam test as a benchmark of acceptable practice was not to abandon 
normative judgment, as some have seen it, but to reinforce the values of the health 
professions. From this view, the ascendancy of the ideology enshrined in the Bolam 
test is a positive choice to build on the moral nature of medicine.
 71
 
 
Many aspects of the history of medical (or health care) law, and its scholarship, can 
be illuminated by these distinctions. For the bulk of the late Twentieth Century 
judicial views, whether expressed in court or ‘extra-judicially’ in lectures or writings, 
adopted the view that the key to success lay in supporting the enterprise of health care 
not challenging it. The judges adopted a view of health care professionals that 
justified the non-interventionist approach enshrined in the Bolam philosophy by 
reference to the ‘professional’ nature of medical and nursing vocations – highly 
skilled, dedicated and altruistic staff applying uncertain but technical knowledge for 
the benefit of patients.
72
 In one case, Mustill LJ indicated why permitting litigation 
against health professionals was worrying 
 
If the unit had not been there, the plaintiff would probably have died. The 
doctors and nurses worked all kinds of hours to look after her baby. They 
safely brought it through the perilous shoals of its early life. For all we know, 
they far surpassed on numerous occasions the standards of reasonable care. 
Yet it is said that for one lapse they (and not just their employers) are to be 
found to have committed a breach of duty. Nobody could criticize the mother 
for doing her best to secure her son’s financial future. But has not the law 
taken a wrong turning if an action of this kind is to succeed.
73
 
 
On this view, delivering health care is an altruistic vocation not a commercial 
enterprise tainted by sordid financial pressures.  
 
For the most part, judges gave similar accounts out of the court setting.
74
 They saw 
their function as enabling health professionals to perform their socially valuable work 
not to tell them how to do it. Thus, the paradox emerged that amidst clamours of the 
legal threat to medicine,
75
 legal commentators expressed some frustration with the 
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hyperbole being offered.
76
 In fact, with its judicial face, the law supported medicine, 
looked favourably on its claims to the moral high ground and presented little threat to 
the autonomy of the professions or the hegemony of medicine. 
 
This has begun to change. In 2001 Lord Woolf called for this attitude to be abandoned 
in a lecture entitled ‘Are the courts excessively deferential to the medical 
profession?’77 In the first few minutes he said that the answer was clearly yes. He 
drew heavily on the work of Ian Kennedy to indicate why that was so, and also on that 
of Margot Brazier, to suggest that things were beginning to change. While his 
evidence for change having already occurred was weak and unconvincing,
78
 the fact 
that so senior a judge called for it is highly significant. It may herald a shift in the 
nature of judging that could play a major role in what I have called the demoralisation 
process. To see how this could occur, it is necessary to consider the varied approaches 
that judges have taken to medical cases. 
 
 
Two types of judging 
 
Two approaches can be considered. In the first, the judiciary has sought to construct 
the legal framework within which health professionals work in such a way as to free 
them from detailed scrutiny. When courts are required to take decisions in difficult 
cases, they have generally been reluctant to codify principles preferring to use the 
concept of best interests as a way to resolve individual disputes without articulating 
precise legal rules. In the heyday of judicial non-intervention, judges were sometimes 
quite open about the importance they attached to enabling health professionals, 
usually doctors, to practise free from the worry of legal scrutiny. Lord Denning can be 
seen as epitomising this approach.
79
 He has argued that it was necessary to ‘say and 
say firmly, that in a professional man, an error of judgment is not negligent.’80 A 
charge of negligence in his view ‘stood on a different footing to a charge of 
negligence against a driver of a motor car’. The consequences were far more serious. 
It affected his professional status and reputation.
81
 Legal liability for doctors would 
mean that ‘a doctor examining a patient, or a surgeon operating at a table, instead of 
getting on with his work, would be for ever looking over his shoulder to see if 
someone was coming up with a dagger – for an action for negligence against a doctor 
is for him like unto a dagger.’82 
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A more sophisticated approach to the value of non-intervention that demonstrates the 
assumption that non-intervention is a mechanism for ensuring that doctors are free to 
practise good medical ethics can be seen in the contribution of Lord Donaldson. He 
regards the legal purpose of consent as narrow, providing the doctor with a defence 
against being sued, but does so in the context of an appreciation of a wider ‘clinical’ 
function of consent that serves to build faith in and co-operation with the treatment.
83
 
He has championed a legal model of partnership between patients and professionals, 
albeit one in which doctors are more equal than others:
84
 
 
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to any child, neither court, 
parents nor doctors. . . . The doctors can recommend treatment A in preference 
to treatment B. They can also refuse to adopt treatment C on the grounds that 
it is medically contra-indicated or for some other reason is a treatment which 
they could not conscientiously administer. The court or parents for their part 
can refuse to consent to treatment A or B or both, but cannot insist on 
treatment C. The inevitable and desirable result is that choice of treatment is in 
some measure a joint decision of the doctors and the court or parents.
85
 
 
Lord Donaldson has been responsible for creating a framework for dealing with 
adolescent refusal of treatment, which I and others have found highly unsatisfactory.
86
 
It permits doctors to rely on parental consent even in the face of a competent young 
person rejecting the treatment in question. Defending this position against criticism, 
he has argued that the saving grace is the context of medical ethics in which the 
paucity of legal rights is placed. Challenged with the observation that his proposals 
would permit abortion to be imposed upon a young woman who wanted to keep her 
child, he countered with the fact that he was confident that medical ethics would not 
permit it.
87
 The alternative view would, he suggested, place doctors in the 
‘intolerable’ position that that they might be sued or prosecuted if they made an 
incorrect legal judgment as to who to go to for consent.
88
 He was satisfied that he had 
established a framework that ensured that the ‘doctor will be presented with a 
professional and ethical but not a legal problem.’89 
 
This assumption that the courts should reinforce medical decision-making rather than 
supplant it can be seen in the way in which the judges have handled the jurisdiction to 
make decisions in the best interests of patients. This has, so far, even survived the 
implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. Faced with early challenges to the 
way in which the law has enabled fundamental decisions on matters of life and death 
to be determined by doctors’ judgment, the courts have minimised the impact the 
rights-talk. Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President of the Family division, has held that the 
logic of the Bland decision survives the introduction of an enforceable right to life. 
Thus, it remains the case that where a responsible body of professional opinion 
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believes that it is not in a patient’s interests to continue active treatment, it can be 
withdrawn. She even went so far as to argue that a responsible decision by a medical 
team not to provide treatment could never constitute a ‘deprivation’ of life within 
article 2.
90
  
 
This tension between the traditional norms of the ‘rule of law’ under which health 
professionals should be subject to regulation through the courts like all others and the 
implicit complicity between judges and doctors is best exposed through the ambiguity 
of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the ‘best interests’ of 
incapacitated patients. In principle, this jurisdiction is exercised by the issuing of a 
declaration of the legal consequences of proposed or past actions. This has been used 
in leading House of Lords cases over the sterilisation of women with learning 
disabilities and the decision whether to continue life sustaining treatment for Tony 
Bland, the young man left in a permanent vegetative state following the Hillsborough 
Stadium disaster.
91
 
 
Although the cases now tend to emphasise the importance of the courts considering 
the interests of patients rather than merely accepting medical opinion, it is hard to find 
evidence of them departing from professional proposals. Far from subordinating 
health care practice to legal control, the courts tend to see themselves as reinforcing 
professional ethics.
92
 They have been resistant to the development of hard rules, the 
sole exception concerning the right of competent adults to refuse treatment.
93
 This 
general approach can be characterised by the assumption that judges and health 
professionals have complementary roles in a single integrated system for ensuring that 
health care is governed by sound moral principles. While this can be portrayed as an 
abdication of the responsibility of law to regulate health care, it seems more accurate 
to describe it as the product of approach taken to judging. 
 
There are, however, some signs that this approach is changing with a newer and less 
deferential cadre of judges.
94
 In particular, it is worth watching for the work of Munby 
J. In many of the cases in which the courts have refused to set ethical guidelines and 
standards, James Munby (then QC) represented the Official Solicitor, acting to protect 
the interests of incapacitated patients. In one case in 1990 he invited the Court of 
Appeal to establish guidance on what type of life should be regarded as so intolerable 
as to justify allowing a child to die. After a strong sanctity of life principle was 
rejected he suggested alternative tests of whether the child’s life was certain to be 
‘bound to be so full of pain and suffering,’ ‘intolerable’ to the child and so 
‘demonstrably awful’ that the child ‘must be condemned to die.’95 The Court of 
Appeal chose to maintain the more general test of ‘best interests’ without refinement 
– an illustration of the resistance to rules. 
 
Now that he is on the bench, Munby J is pioneering a much more legalistic approach 
to medical law cases. While most judges have been prepared to use the common sense 
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of the ‘best interests’ label to reduce the need to consider precedents and distinctions, 
Munby J’s judgments are replete with citations and legal argument. In his hands, 
health care law is becoming more like law and less like an extension of professional 
ethics. In R (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health he presented a masterful and 
erudite review of case law over one hundred and fifty years, Nineteenth Century 
medical literature and academic literature in a judgment that ran to three hundred and 
ninety eight paragraphs.
96
 The issue in the case was whether the morning after pill 
could be used without the Abortion Act procedures of medical inquiry into specific 
legal grounds and a second opinion. Two previous judges had felt able to resolve the 
issue by reference to the common use of language and current medical practice.
97
 It 
would have been open to Munby J to have elected to follow the earlier decision.
98
 
Instead, he regarded it as important to resolve the issue by reference to full legal 
argument including a detailed consideration of the relevant techniques of statutory 
interpretation. 
 
It is also becoming apparent that Munby J is less inclined than other judges to express 
empathy with health professionals and more concerned to treat them like any other 
citizens subject to the law. This has already been shown in relation to the Watts 
decision. It can also be seen in his greater reference to human rights law and his 
concern to use it to move the law in the direction he regards as desirable.
99
 The most 
important illustration of this to date can be found in Munby J’s decision in R (Burke) v 
GMC.100 In that case, he upheld Mr Burke’s challenge to the guidance issued by the 
GMC on withholding life sustaining treatment on the basis that it failed to give due 
regard to his human rights. In the judge’s view, there were a number of failings. First, 
the guidance emphasised the right of competent patients to refuse treatment, and 
failed to give due regard to the right to require it. Second, it gave insufficient 
acknowledgement to the duty of a doctor, who was unwilling to provide the treatment 
that a patient wanted, to continue that treatment until a doctor was found who would 
accede to the patient’s wishes. Third, it failed sufficiently to acknowledge the heavy 
presumption in favour of life sustaining treatment and to recognise that the touchstone 
of best interests was intolerability. Fourth it failed to set out the legal requirement to 
obtain prior judicial sanction for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in 
a number of circumstances, which the judgment spelt out. 
 
Some of these findings are more controversial than others. The criticism that there 
was insufficient regard to the right to require treatment, needs to be considered against 
the fact the previously English courts have declined to accept any such legal right to a 
specific treatment.
101
 Munby J seems to be working to carve one out. The second 
criticism is arguably a development of comments by Butler-Sloss P in Ms B v NHS 
Hospital Trust102 but was taken much further by Munby J, who also indicated that he 
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thought there were reasons to think that the traditional reluctance of the courts to 
compel doctors to treat against their clinical judgment might need to change in the 
light of the Human Rights Act 1998.
103
 If this view were to prevail, the relationship 
between the courts and doctors would change significantly. The courts would take 
onto themselves the responsibility to determine what treatment should be given and 
the right to compel doctors to accept their rulings even when they regard them as 
incompatible with their professional responsibilities. This would move beyond the 
complementary judicial and medical roles that the integrated approach to law and 
ethics into a more confrontational environment. 
 
The third criticism, in relation to the sanctity of life principle and best interests, is 
particularly important and interesting for the fact that it saw Munby J championing an 
approach that he had put unsuccessfully before the Court of Appeal in Re J  as 
counsel in that case.
104
 If there is to be a redefinition of the best interests test in terms 
of intolerability, then this can be seen as a shift away from a broad approach that has 
been used by judges to justify accepting professional opinion towards a more 
legalistic approach that seeks to develop precise tests that health professionals are 
then expected to apply. In addition to the past rejection of the ‘intolerability’ test, 
there would seem to be divergent views on the current Family Division bench on its 
usefulness. In Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt Hedley J rejected the idea that such a 
gloss on the best interests test, or a supplementary one to be added to it, was helpful. 
He noted the earlier rejection of Munby’s approach and declined to follow it.105 The 
Court of Appeal has so far upheld the traditional approach, supporting Hedley J’s 
analysis in Wyatt and criticising that of Munby J in Burke.106 It remains to be seen 
whether Munby J should be seen as the pioneer of a new model of judging in health 
care cases, or whether this activity is an isolated diversion and the traditional 
approach will be continued. 
 
The importance of these issues is high. The established non-interventionist stance is 
based on a deference to doctors, a belief that their practice enshrines moral values and 
the aspiration to construct a legal relationship between patients and health 
professionals that enables that morality to flourish. While deference is now hard to 
justify, the integrated model of law and professional activity working together to 
secure a common end of moral practice can be seen as a deliberate project to promote 
moral values. The new model judge, exemplified by Munby J, approaches things very 
differently. He rejects deference to the health professions, sees health care as 
equivalent to other (commercial) enterprises and therefore to be regulated from 
outside without any trust in industry values and without any special rules for health 
care. This constructs the position of the patient as consumer dictating what should 
happen, with little scope for moral independence of health professionals. Such a 
construction is essentially value neutral and once more serves to marginalize the 
moral content of medical law. It can be seen that this new approach to judging health 
care practice is consistent with other developments that serve to ‘demoralise’ the 
enterprise of medical or health care law. 
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The road ahead 
 
We now need to turn to the implications of this transformation for the future shape of 
what I call Health Care Law. Twenty years ago Ian Kennedy gently bemoaned the 
emergence of real law in the field (which he called medical law) suggesting that it 
sucked the life out of it. 
 
Medical law used to be fun. All you had to do was read a lot of strange 
American cases, the odd Commonwealth decision, and maybe some English 
nineteenth century cases on crime then you could reflect that none of these 
was relevant and get on with the fun of inventing answers. Suddenly, in the 
last few years, the courts have got into the act. Cases have come rattling along. 
Medical law is beginning to get a corpus of law. Medical lawyers are having 
to do homework.
107
 
 
The great advantage of the absence of legal precedent was that it was possible to go 
directly to the substance of the issues. Ian and his colleagues at Kings College London 
pioneered an approach to medical law that was sustained by a commitment to ethical 
values. On his analysis, the key themes that gave the subject its integrity and 
coherence were fundamental ethical principles: 
 
which permeate all the problems which arise in medical law: respect for 
autonomy, consent, truth-telling, confidentiality, respect for persons, respect 
for dignity, and respect for justice.
108
 
 
These principles were derived neither from legal authorities nor from professional 
practice, but from the emerging discipline of bioethics. I have long been critical of 
this approach for its failure to explain how medical law has really worked. My 
assessment of the material was that it was shaped far more by inter-professional 
politics and the assumptions made by the judiciary about the nature of medicine than 
this analysis allowed. These factors, I have argued, are more successful as an account 
of the actual practice of lawmakers in parliament and in the courts than the legal 
conceptualisation based on a consumerist separation of clinical and ethical issues. 
 
My more mature reflections, as I have tried to explain, recognise that this was only a 
partial understanding of what was going on – medical law seen through a glass darkly 
as St Paul might have put it. The development of the law was not driven by such 
ethical principles, but it was consciously formed in such a way as to enable them to 
flourish. Its attractiveness was that it enabled health care professionals to work 
towards a high standard of ethics. This gave it a normative strength, which I had 
initially thought to be absent in the mere reinforcement of professional monopoly 
power.
109
 Its weakness lay in its inability to ensure that this happened.
110
 As I 
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suggested in 1989 and Lord Woolf argued in 2001 this approach worked only so long 
as levels of trust in health professionals were high. 
 
Unfortunately, a series of scandals have served to undermine that trust; paediatric 
services at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, the Alder Hey inquiry into 
retention of children’s organs, the murderous GP Harold Shipman. While each of 
these actually raises different types of problems, the cumulative effect has been to 
shatter the illusion that the regulation of health care does not require the same legal 
scrutiny as other spheres of activity. The difference between health care and other 
enterprises no longer seems so large either to the public or the judiciary. 
 
There are two main roads down which this might take us. I have traced the first as 
being one that suppresses the moral nature of medicine and opens up health care law 
to general legal and market disciplines. Margaret Brazier and Nicola Glover have 
argued that medical law is migrating from a basis in family law, tort and 
jurisprudence to being founded within consumer and public law.
111
 They go on to ask 
whether, on this basis, medical law is really a subject at all. When asked that, I have 
usually answered that the concepts seem similar to those used more generally, but in 
their application to health services, they work differently.  
 
Even the Bolam test does not exclude, as a matter of law, judicial standard setting for 
non-medical professionals. But for medicine, at least until recently, it has been 
sufficient to demonstrate that common practice has been followed. The coherence of 
health care law seemed to lie in its consistent trust in doctors and resistance to rule 
making. It was concerned with establishing procedures and providing reassurance of 
professional good faith rather than telling doctors what to do. The developments 
mapped out earlier in this piece show that these concerns are changing. In the 
emerging judicial approach, it is hard to see how the claim to a discrete subject area 
can be defended. Ian Kennedy’s claim to coherence through pervasive ethical 
principles is even more vulnerable in this context than it was under the more 
integrated approach. For, as Aldous Huxley portrayed there is no place for ethics in a 
consumerist hedonistic Brave New World. It is all a matter of choice rather than 
morality. The lawyer’s general tool kit will suffice with no special amendments. The 
development of the law without the special trust in doctors has resulted in amorality 
not more morality. 
 
There would seem to be two main strategies for retrieving health care law from this 
demoralising amoral world. The first would be a strategy of resistance. This would 
need to take the form of making limitations on choice in the name of morality 
legitimate. The European Court of Human Rights offered some possibility of this in 
its decision in the Pretty case. The House of Lords had sought to exclude rights 
analysis from its consideration, holding that the ethical issues at stake should be 
considered directly, not prejudged by the definitions set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
112
 The European Court of Human Rights found a role 
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for a right to autonomy, based on an important extension of article 8,
113
 possibly the 
first foundation for a specific legal right to autonomy in our law. However, the Court 
also found that this right to autonomy was limited by the rights of others. In this case 
the rights of those who might be vulnerable to exploitation if the existing prohibitions 
on euthanasia were lifted. They accepted this without any evidence being adduced 
that such a risk actually existed.  
 
This approach seeks legitimacy in the law of human rights. It has the merit that it can 
proceed by interpreting existing documents whose wording, if not its meaning, has 
been established. Further, human rights can be said to have foundational status, 
through international agreement, and build the enforcement of the morality that they 
enshrine on the basis of this form of prior consent. It has the disadvantages that is by 
nature legalistic, the dangers of which have already been illustrated, that the human 
rights documents in question have not been drafted to deal with issues in the medical 
context, and that scrutiny rapidly reveals that deep-rooted moral disputes, such as the 
proper approach to the human embryo, are barely hidden beneath the surface of the 
law. Yet, as we have already seen the legalistic nature of the discourse by which these 
debates are resolved makes addressing those deeper issues problematic. 
 
Once health care law is something that constrains consumer choice, it becomes 
necessary to show why society is justified in preventing people behaving as they wish. 
Within the NHS this can be partly justified by the fact that receiving health care is 
supported by taxpayers’ money and therefore does not only concern individuals. Yet 
in the marketplace this type of claim cannot be made, as the Blood case demonstrates. 
Reconceptualising health care as solely a market good pushes us, as Bobbitt 
suggested, to abandon the claim that we can prevent people doing things merely 
because they are immoral. 
 
An alternative strategy would be built around reclaiming the moral basis of health 
care practice and restoring trust in medicine and the other health professions. This 
involves working with the professional bodies, both statutory and collegiate, such as 
the Royal Colleges and the BMA. The General Medical Council in particular has 
pursued a conscious policy of rebranding medicine in order to restore trust and retain 
self-regulation.
114
 In many ways they are catching up with the other health professions 
who have previously used strategies of professionalisation in similar ways.
115
 The 
BMA has been one of the most prolific producers of ethical guidance in the health 
care system. This is an approach that seeks to restore legitimacy to the assumptions on 
which the integrated approach to health care law and ethics is based. 
 
Health care lawyers can and have been playing an important role in this process. 
Many working parties and committees include legal academics. Sir Ian Kennedy has 
played a crucial role in shaping the current culture of the NHS through his report into 
Paediatric Surgery in Bristol and as Chair of the Healthcare Commission. Professor 
Margaret Brazier has chaired the Retained Organ Commission handling some of the 
consequences of the failure to secure parental consent to post-mortems at the Alder 
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Hey Hospital in Liverpool and elsewhere. Professor Alexander McCall Smith is vice-
chair of the Human Genetics Commission. Following the decision in the Blood case, 
Professor Sheila Maclean reviewed the law for the Department of Health. For those of 
us who are driven by wanting to make a positive contribution to health services, this 
route rather than the confrontational one is the more attractive. 
 
So how successful has the law been, and how successful can it be in maintaining a 
moral basis for health care practice? I suggested in a lecture at UCL in 2000 that the 
attempt to set and police moral standards for medicine from outside through the law 
had failed to demonstrate much impact, due mostly to lack of sympathy with this 
project from the judges.
116
 I am not much encouraged by the new found enthusiasm 
for intervention because it seems to me to have had the result of excluding moral 
concerns rather than promoting them.  
 
I have suggested that in the integrative mode, while the law did little to alter the moral 
values that underpinned practice, it did create a legal context in which that 
professional morality could flourish. If the disturbing trends that I have identified 
continue, there are strong reasons to think that the engagement of law with medicine 
is proving demoralising in both of the senses that I outlined at the beginning of this 
lecture. It is making debate about the morality of health care practice more difficult 
and undermining the morale of health professionals. The question now is how those 
pitfalls can be evaded. I believe that it can only be through a partnership between law 
and medicine constructed to maintain a moral basis for health care practice.  
 
This can be seen in Rowan Williams’ terms as moving on from a pre-modern period 
in which law merely sanctioned medical power, overcoming the rivalry of the modern 
period, but avoiding the pitfall of a value free public sphere where medicine is merely 
another commodity in the market-state. It does so by reasserting the fundamental 
connection between medicine and morality through the creation of an intermediate 
professional community, neither purely of the state, nor merely individual economic 
actors. For Williams this was the role of religious faiths, for us it is the role of 
collegiate health care professions. 
 
I hope, therefore, that I have mapped out some of the roads that health care has been 
following and hopes to travel down. I have described some of the winds of change 
that drive us along, and some of the sources of the energy that sustains good practice. 
I have tried to show that there can still be a place for ethics in health care practice, 
although we will have to fight for it, and that morale amongst professionals need not 
be low. I trust that the future for health services and health care law will be long and 
distinguished. 
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